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\u05d1\u05e1 \"\u05d3<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most well-known mitzvot in this week\u2019s Torah portion is \u201cM\u2019dvar Sheker Tirchak\u201d \u2013 the command to distance oneself from falsehood. Although this mitzvah comes in the context of laws of the Jewish court, it also applies to daily life. However, according to Jewish law there are a number of situations where one is permitted, or even obligated to lie. This is a very unusual situation, whereby the Torah forbids something, and then allows it in a number of instances.1<\/a><\/sup> This gives rise to the question of how do we understand this phenomenon in general, and more specifically, when is it forbidden to lie and when is it permitted?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Firstly, it is instructive to analyze exceptions to the prohibition to lie. The Talmud in Yevamot2<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0teaches that it is, \u201cmutar leshanot mipnay haShalom<\/em>\u201d – It is permitted to bend the truth for the sake of peace. The Talmud even proves that G-d did so when telling Avraham what Sarah had said but He omitted that Sarah had said that Avraham was old. In the Talmud in Kesubot3<\/a><\/sup>, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel argue about what a person should say to a groom about his bride \u2013 Beit Shammai holds that one must say the complete truth, even if it is not complimentary, whereas Beis Hillel hold that one can praise the Kallah even when the praise is not merited. As is always the case, the halacha follows Beis Hillel, therefore one should follow his approach. Finally, The Talmud in Bava Metsiah states that Torah scholars only lie in three areas (relating to humility, modesty and kindness). The obvious implication of this is that it is permitted and even correct to lie in these situations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that all these examples are permitted indicates that the lies discussed in the Talmud are not in fact forbidden by the Torah. This point is indeed made by the earlier commentaries: The Sefer Yeraim4<\/a><\/sup> writes that the Torah Prohibition to lie only applies when the lie adversely effects someone else. He explains that this is why Beis Hillel hold that it is permitted to praise the bride because the groom has already married her, so lying about here doesn\u2019t adversely affect him. Rabbeinu Yonah5<\/a><\/sup> writes in a similar vein that the Torah prohibition of telling a lie does not apply when the lie does not harm the person (he calls this \u2018mah bekach\u2019<\/em>). This explains why the above examples do not constitute the Torah prohibition. In each case, the person being lied to is not adversely affected by the lie.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is important to note that Rabbeinu Yonah continues that even lies that do not harm one\u2019s fellow are generally forbidden at least on a Rabbinic level, based on a verse in Mishlei, because lying for no reason is inherently wrong. Yet since they are not forbidden by the Torah, the Rabbis permitted them in the specific scenarios discussed in the Talmud, where lying is not wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We now understand why a number of permits to lie in the Rabbinic sources l do not contradict the Torah prohibition of Sheker because they do not adversely affect one\u2019s fellow. However, there are other Gemaras that permit lying even when it is at the expense of someone else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Talmud in Yevamot6<\/a><\/sup> brings a story where Rebbe Chiya and Abaye promised money to a man who did not want to do chalitsa (a type of legal divorce in specific situations), but after he agreed, they said they were tricking him (meshateh ani bach). The Gemara in Nedarim7<\/a><\/sup> teaches that if someone is trying to unjustifiably take property from a person, then he is allowed to lie and say that it is not his property. He is even permitted to make a vow that it is not his, such as to make a vow that he won\u2019t eat bread if this property is his, but have in mind, that he won\u2019t eat bread today, but not forever. It is not normally allowed to vow in such a way, but in this case, it is permitted.8<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n In these cases, the person being lied to is certainly adversely affected by the lies, which would suggest that the lies are included in the Torah\u2019s prohibition not to lie. Accordingly, how can Chazal permit lying in such cases? This problem is not limited to the Gemara \u2013 one of the most famous stories in the Torah also seems to show how one of the Patriarchs lied at the expense of someone else. That is the account of how Yaakov tricked his father Yitzchak in order to receive the blessings at the expense of his elder brother Esav.9<\/a><\/sup> How could Yaakov lie in such a way that clearly caused Esav harm?10<\/a><\/sup> Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky11<\/a><\/sup> explains that it is permitted to use trickery to overcome someone who himself is dishonest. Esav had deceived Yitzchak into thinking that he was righteous and deserving of the blessings, when in truth, he was not. Accordingly, Yaakov was allowed to act in a seemingly dishonest way in order to prevent the deceitful Esav from receiving the blessings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rav Kamenetsky\u2019s approach teaches that when the Torah forbade lying at the expense of someone else, it did not include lying when that person is a liar himself of otherwise acting incorrectly. This also explains the aforementioned Gemaras that permit lying even when it harms someone else. In each case, the other person is acting wrongly or being deceitful themselves, and therefore it is allowed to lie in order to prevent his immoral plans coming to fruition.12<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n It still needs to be understood in a philosophical level when it is allowed to lie in the above situations. Rav Eliyahu Dessler13<\/a><\/sup>\u00a0explains we need to alter our understanding of the Torah definition of truth and Sheker according. Emes is that which leads to good and the fulfilment of the will of G-d and falsehood is that which takes away from that. Thus, if, for example, a person is \u2018brutally honest\u2019 and tells the groom the unadulterated \u2018truth\u2019 about his bride, he is causing unnecessary pain which is clearly in contradiction to the will of G-d. Likewise, if someone tells the \u2018truth\u2019 about what someone said about his fellow, and thereby causes discord, he is also acting against G-d\u2019s will14<\/a><\/sup>. And finally, if a person is himself acting dishonestly or immorally in some other way, outwitting him and thwarting his nefarious plans is in line with the will of G-d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We have seen that the Torah definition of truth and falsehood is far more profound than merely being about words that are technically accurate or not, rather Emes brings good to the world, and falsehood does the opposite. The following story demonstrates these ideas: On one occasion, a yeshiva student was sitting with the great Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski when suddenly another bochur burst into the room with good tidings of some sort. Rav Chaim Ozer reacted with great joy and thanked the bochur. Not long after, another bochur came in with the same news, unaware that Rabbi Chaim Ozer already heard about it. However, to the surprise of the boy who was with him, the Rabbi reacted as if he had never heard the news, and again showed great joy and appreciation. This happened a few more times and each time the Rabbi reacted in the same way. It was evident that the Rabbi understood the great pleasure that each student would derive from telling the leading Sage good news. Accordingly, he decided that it was better to hide the truth in order to give joy to these boys<\/p>\n\n\n\n May we all merit to attain the Torah understanding of Truths, not just viewed in a narrow sense. May we all merit that the Torah infiltrates every aspect of our lives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Por el rabino Yehonasan Gefen<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n PORCI\u00d3N SEMANAL DE LA TOR\u00c1<\/strong>,<\/p>\n\n\n\n La luz que gu\u00eda<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\nMishpatim\u00a0(Exodus 21-24<\/a>\u00a0)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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por Rabino Yehonasan Gefen<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n